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WASHINGTON LAW REVIE:W
AND
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 22 FEBRUARY, 1947 NUMBER I
COOPERATIVE CORPORATION LAW ON THE
MAIKETING TRANSACTION
By A. LADRu JENSEN*
N THE evolution of law, commercial transactions precede the legal rules
which later develop to govern them. Men exchange goods, services, and
money. They organize to facilitate business purposes. They compete for
a better market. Vital differences of opinion arise. These controversies are
followed by judicial decisions and legislation to define and regulate the per-
sonal, group and property rights and relationships which earlier economic
dealings have created.
Inventors, engineers, railroad manufacturers, entrepeneurs, bankers, con-
tractors and working men pioneered the building of railroads. Slowly but
surely the lawyers, judges and legislators came along afterwards and erected
a law of common carriers. Similarly, many natural persons and private-profit
corporations constructed automobiles and placed them in the hands of the
public. Again the lawyers, judges and legislators applied their techniques and
established a new branch of junsprudence called automobile law.
In our generation American agricultural leaders have pioneered a new sys-
tem of marketing. They have developed and expanded a new type of business
unit: an association of producers acting by and ,through a non-profit cor-
poration agent which they create and control. In our day the lawyers, admm-
istrators, judges and legislators are engaged in clarifying the legal concepts
involved in the personal, corporate and propity relations which a pioneering
generation of agricultural cooperators have created by their new-commercial
practice called cooperative marketing.
*Dr. A. Ladru Jensen is professor of corporation law at the University of
Utah School of Law, and consultant on legal education to the American Institute
of Cooperation of Washington, D. C.
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This new development has been aptly described by the Honorable Clinton P
Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture for the United States. In substance he
declared that the ingenuity and loyalty of American farmers have combined
the ideas of a non-profit corporation and a voluntary marketing association
to rehabilitate a depressed industry 1 Under generally competent leadership,
he opined, the modern non-profit cooperative corporation accepts delivery of,
warehouses, grades, processes, packages, finances and markets all kinds of
agricultural products in an economic and efficient manner. This new method
of joint selling provides its member beneficiaries with a fairer return upon
their labors and invested capital than they formerly received under individual
competitive marketing.2 This practice increases the relative purchasing power
of millions of farmers. Through cooperative marketing, agricultural products
flow more evenly into the channels of trade, a vital industry is stabilized, and
the general welfare made more secure.3
The efforts of farmers to engage in joint marketing operations have from
the first incurred active opposition from the commission merchants whom
cooperative selling would replace. In 1913, at the suit of a Chicago hog
buyer, the cooperative farmers of Decorah, Iowa, were judicially condemned
as crimnal conspirators for organizing a cooperative marketing association.
In that year the Supreme Court of Iowa held a group of Decorah hog raisers,
who associated for collective marketing of their hogs, to be an illegal combina-
tion in restraint of trade, and enjoined them from engaging further in joint
selling operations. 4
The right to orgamze for collective marketing was gained from 1914 to 1922
by the enactment of the Clayton Act, 5 and particularly of the Capper-Volstead
Act,6 by the Congress of the United States. The latter act, which guarantees
" ANDERSON, HON. CLINTON P., U. S. Secretary of Agriculture, CooPERATrVEs AND
THE FARM FAmny. Address given before the National Council of Farmer Co-
operatives at Chicago, Ill., in January, 1946, published by said council, Washing-
ton, D. C., 1946, pp. 7-8.
2 Id. at 1-6. 8 Ibid.
' Reeves v. Decorah Farmers Cooperative Society of Iowa, 160 Ia. 194, 140
N. W 844, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1104 (1913)
5 The Clayton Act of 1914, 38 STAT. 731, 15 U. S. C. A. 17, has a brief sentence
exempting from the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act "agricultural
organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual self-help." This scant ref-
erence was viewed by the cooperative lawyers as inadequate. See EvANs mo
STocxDyx, TiE LAW OF COOPERATIVE MARERTING, Rochester, N. Y., The Lawyers'
Coop. Pub. Co. (1937) 109. However, in one of the first cases involving this ex-
emption, a prosecution for criminal conspiracy was quashed. See United States
v. Dairy Cooperative Assn. of Portland, 49 F Supp. 475 (D. C. Ore., 1943)
a CAPPER-VoLSTEAD ACT, 42 STAT. 388, 7 U. S. C. A. 291 (1922) This act pro-
vided among other things, that agricultural cooperative associations might be
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freedom of cooperative marketing, is properly regarded as the Magna Charta
of American agriculture. This bill of rights has not precluded economic,
political and legal attacks against cooperative marketing. The opposition
has continued although the point of attack has shifted from time to time.
Convincing evidence of the virility of the current attack is found in the
testimony before, and in report of, the Roylal Commission -on Cooperatives
7
in Canada, published late m 1943, and in the Interim Report on Cooperative
Competition, by the House Committee on Small Busmess,8 published in this
country in April, 1946. The organization early in 1946 of a Committee on
Cooperative Law within the Section on Corporations, Banking and Mercantile
Law of the American Bar Association9 is indicative of the current interest in,
and attention to, this new branch of jurisprudence-cooperative corporation.
law.
ECONOMIC PATTERN OF A TYPICAL MARKETING COOPERATIVE
Before analyzing the basic legal relationships between corporate agent and
producer patron resulting from the creation and operation of cooperative
corporations, let us briefly survey the economic pattern and practices of a
typical cooperative marketing corporation-association.
A group of farmers who raise silar products associate together for' the
purpose of incorporating a non-profit corporation through which to market
their products. They orally agree among themselves to support this newly
created agent by making continuous deliveries of their agricultural products
to it over a specified number of years. The written agreements made by thenv
to accomplish these purposes are, strangely enough, not entered into among
the producer-associates but are made between each associate and the coopera-
tive corporation which they cause to be created. They are called the marketing
organized for the mutual benefit of members provided they conform to one or
both of the following requirements: first, one member, one vote; and second,
dividends on stock or membership capital shall not exceed 8 per cent per annum.
The act also required that the value of non-member products dealt with should
not exceed the value of member products handled by the cooperative association.
7 Report, ROYAL Cozl sSIoN ON COOPERATIWS, Edmund Cloutier,-prmter, Otta-
wa, Canada (1945)
8 HousE ComunTTnE ON SMALL BusnFass, Report No. 1888, THE CoMpEwmoN or
COOPERATIVES w rH OTHER FORMS OF BusINEsS ENTERPRIsE, U. S. Govt. Printing
Office, Wash., D. C. (April 9, 1946)
0 Proceedings of Section of. Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association, Chicago, IMI., 1945-46, p. IX. It is also significant that the
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Wash., D. C., appointed a legal and
tax committee in 1942, and the American Institute of Cooperation, Philadelphia,
Pa., an educational non-profit corporation, appointed a committee of lawyers on
legal education in November df 1945.
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agreements."0 But their economic function is to create an association of
agricultural producers legally bound to market the members' products through
a common marketing agent.
The marketing contracts, although intended to be coextensive with the
agricultural production by the member, nevertheless usually provide for a
right of withdrawal of members during a certain brief period in any year,
conditioned upon prior written notice of intention to terminate the agreement.
These marketing contracts also ordinarily provide that the corporation may
exercise its sole discretion and judgment in grading, processing, packaging,
warehousing, financing, and marketing of the products of the members. Out
of these seemingly simple economic practices have arisen a series of complex
problems of cooperative corporation law.
CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF COOPERATIVE CORPORATION LAW
We find in this new field of law a form of non-profit corporation, heretofore
used for educational and charitable purposes, now uniquely adapted to com-
mercial practices. Cooperative corporations, in the language of "The Bingham
Cooperative Act," "are not organized to make a profit" (meaning economic
gain, not profit in the ordinary business sense) "for themselves, as such, or
for their members, as such, but only for their members as producers.""
In this new field of cooperative corporation law is found a non-profit
business corporation, created to serve multiple producer principals as their
joint marketing agent. Here too, is found considerable confusion m the
intermingling of legal concepts of agency, bailment, trust, and of sale and
purchase.
A survey of the cases indicates that a cooperative marketing corporation
presents four legal relationships prior to the sale of the products by the
corporation which have their own distinctive incidents m business law,
namely-
1. A continuing and non-revocable agency, except for a stipulated privilege
of withdrawal.
2. A selling agency plus a bailment.
3. A selling agency plus trust or agency title.
4. A sale and purchase for benefit of the primary producer.
COOPERATIVE CORPORATION ASSOCIATIONS
Cooperative marketing via a corporation indicates a specialization of labor
between the farmers who grow or raise the agricultural products and the
1 0 EvAxs AND STOCEDYK, op. cit. supra note 5 at 86-158.
" "The Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act," Acts of the General Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1922, c. 1, pp. 2-23. The identical language
is found a year earlier in Laws of Washington, 1921, § 1, p. 357.
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non-profit corporate agent which markets them. The specialization of labor
between the associated producers on the one hand, and the common selling
agent on the other is frequently duplicated in the specialization of economic
activity of partners.
In Duryea v. Whitcovtb=2 three of the four partners were given the exclu-
sive right and duty to carry on the selling of potatoes for the firm in New
York. The modem cooperative marketing corporation has the same economic
function as did the selling partners in Duryea v. Witcormb, supra. The fact
that the cooperative corporation occupies an economic position similar to a
selling partner in relation to the associated producers suggests the question
whether this relationship resembles in its legal incidents that established in
partnerships?
The Uniform Partnership Act allows a corporation to be a partner, 8
whenever the corporation law governing its creation will allow .that situation.
The act, however, requires that the partners shall be associated to "carry on
as co-owners a business for profit. " 14 We shall see from an analysis of the
cases that the cooperative marketing corporation carries on business as an
agent rather than as an associate, although the cooperative corporation
statutes usually refer to the corporation. as a cooperative association."5 The
property relationship between the producer members and the cooperative
regarding products delivered to the latter, is not that of co-owner; but,
depending upon the agreement of the parties, is either that of bailor and
bailee, beneficiary and trustee, or occasionally seller and purchaser. .Also, as
we have previously noted from the illustrative text of the Bingham Act, Supra,
a cooperative marketing corporation is not engaged in carrying on a business
to make a profit for the corporation, but only to make economic gain for its
members as producers, with the exception of the earnings that are needed to
pay dividends on corporation stock.10
2 In Duryea v. Whitcomb, 31 Vt. 395 (1858), the defendant was the authorized
agent of the business unit to buy potatoes in Vermont and New Hampshire and
A. Duryea, W. E. Duryea and Isaac B. Lewis were authorized to act as the
selling agents of the association in the state of New York.
"
5Under the Uniform Partnership Act "Person includes individuals, partner-
ships, corporations, and other associations," § 2.1
, The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as: "An association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit," § 6- (1).15 The parent Bingham Act of 1922, supra note 11, read in part: "An Act author-
izing the formation of non-profit, cooperative assoctations.'. "The term 'Assocta-
ation' means any corporation organized under this Act," § 2 (c). I
26Although it is sometimes contended (and truly conformable to basic co-
operative principle) that the payment of dividends, by a cooperative is really
in the nature of interest on necessary capital, it has, nevertheless, been repeatedly
held under the present and past income tax acts that dividends paid on the stock
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Early in the development of cooperative corporation law the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington considered the question of whether the cooperative
corporation was legally a joint venturer with the associated member producers
who pooled their products and shipped them through the company The
court answered this question in the negative. 17
The cooperative corporation enjoys a more permanent business relationship
with its producer members than exists between partners. In the situation of
Duryea v. Whitcomb, supra, either partner could withdraw at pleasure and
terminate the partnership at will. Aside from a limited contractual right of
withdrawal granted to producer members they are irrevocably bound to the
cooperative, and under many marketing contracts can be enjoined from
refusing to deliver their products 8 or compelled to pay substantial stipulated
damages if they deliver their products elsewhere.19
The idea that a cooperative corporation is a new species of business asso-
ciation between the producer members and their juristic marketing entity
is today a dominant concept, in cooperative corporation law.20 The very
terms, "cooperative corporation," imply a group of natural persons legally
associated in cooperative relationship with a corporation.
We may, therefore, conclude that a cooperative marketing corporation-
association is a business unit quite as unique and distinctive in its legal
incidents as were the statutory co-partnership associations 2' of over a half
of a cooperative corporation association constitute income to the corporation.
See: Sacred Heart Cooperative Mercantile Co., 2 B. T. A. 24 (1925), Appeal of
Farmers' Cooperative Association, 5 B. T. A. 61 (1926), Appeal of Trego County
Cooperative Association, 6 B. T. A. 1275 (1927), and Appeal of Farmers' Coop-
erative Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 B. T. A. 696 (1927)
'17 Hudnall et al. v. Pennmgton & Co, et al., 136 Wash. 155, 239 Pac. 2 (1925)
18 EVANS AND STOCICDYIK, Op. cit. supra note 5 at 130. 2" Id. at 129-30.
20 "The Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Association Act" was the title of
the uniform act approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association in 1936. 9 U iFoaiV LAwS ANN., Edward Thomp-
son Co., 41-59. This act is now the Model Agricultural Cooperative Association
Act. See HANDBOOK or TnE NATIONAL CONERExNcE OF CownvissioERS ON UN3ORIv
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1943) 66. The act is, "concerning agricultural
cooperative associations; providing for the incorporation, management and dis-
solution thereof."
21 Concerning "partnership association," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
clared in Laf-in & Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 441, 23 At1. 215, 216 (1892)-
"The Act of 1874, it will be seen, was not a mere amendment or supplement to
anything that went bdfore, but like the Act of 1836, a new scheme carefully and
elaborately drawn, creating a new kind of artificial person, standing between a
limited partneship as previously known and a corporation, and partaking of the
attributes of each." See also for analysis of legal nature of a statutory Michigan
partnership association: Stayer & Abbott Mfg. Co. v. Blake, 111 Mich. 282, 69
N. W 508 (1896)
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century ago and very similar to that earlier type of business unit, except that
the member principals of modem cooperative corporations are absolutely
insulated from personal liability on the contracts of their marketing agent,
rather than being conditionally exempted from personal liability as was
provided for by several statutes which authorized co-partnership associa-
tions.22
A PRIVATE-PROFIT CORPORATION AS AN AGENT
The law of private-profit corporation places a rather strict limitation upon
the privilege of a corporation to act as an agent for third party principals
who would exercise control over its business policies and methods of operation.
The theory of the general corporation laws is that the sovereign state
grants to the corporation the rights to be, and to act as a distinct legal
entity; and m so doing, expressly provides that the Board of Directors is
to have the exclusive control of corporate policies and actions.28 This carries
the implication that third party principals shall not replace the directors in
any degree in the control of the corporation.
In the early Massachusetts case of Whittenton Mills v. UptonU' it was held
that a corporation could not lawfully enter into a co-partnership with natural
persons to engage in the manufacture of cotton goods; because to allow
control of corporate activities through the business contracts of natural
persons associated with it would make it an agent of such associates as prin-
" The acts authorizing the creation of co-partnership associations, supra note
21, provided that personal liability of members would result from false statements
in the articles of association or failure to use the word "Lunited" at the end
of the association name.
The Bingham Act, supra note 13, provides in § 14, "No member shall be liable
for the debts of the association to an amount exceeding the sum remaining unpaid
on his membership fee or his subscription to the capital stock, mcluding any
unpaid balance on any promissory notes given in payment thereof"
The Model Agricultural Cooperative Association Act, supra, note 20, provides
in § 10 (d) "No member shall be personally liable for any debt or liability of
the association."
See also: 77 A..L. R. 421.
23 The Uniform Business Corporation Act reads: "Section 31. The business
of every corporation shall be managed by a Board of at least three Directors."
9 UzFORm LAWS ANN. 125. REmv. R . STAT. (1943 Supp. Title 25) § 3803-31.
2' Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10 Gray (Mass.) 582 (1858) Accord: Gunn v.
Central R. R., 74 Ga. 509 (1885); Bishop v..American Preservers Co., 157 IMI.
284, 41 N. E. 785 (1895); White Star Line v.. Star Line, 141 Mich. 604, 105 N. W
U,35 (1905);.Burke v. Concord R. R., 61 N. H. 160 (1881); People v. North River
Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582 (1890), Boyd v. American Carbon Black Co.,
182 Pa. 206, 37 At. 937 (1897); Huguenot Mills v. Jempson, 68 S. C. 363, 47 S. E.
687 (1904); Mallary v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W 396 (1888); Pearce
v. Madison R. R., 21 How. (U. S.) 441 (1859) Cf. Allen v. Woonsocket Co., 11
R. I. 288 (1876)
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
cipals, and the managing directors and officers of the company would then
be deprived of part of the control of the corporation which the laws of its
creation reserved exclusively to them.
A later California case indicates the line of demarcation. The California
Supreme Court held in a case where a third party entered into a joint real
estate operation with a corporation, that where a partnership was not con-
templated, and the contracting party was not given control of the corporation
as his agent, but the corporation was left free through its corporate directors
and officers to control its corporate affairs and to secure a result for itself
and the contractee within its authorized powers, that it might contract with
a private person to enter jointly into a real estate transaction and divide the
profits and share the losses when the independence of the corporation as a
principal was not violated.
25
CORPORATIONS AUTHORIZED TO ACT AS AGENTS
While general business corporations may not ordinarily become agents of
natural persons with power to act as a controlling principal, still the legislature
may authorize corporations to do so, and may even provide that the member
principals shall not be personally liable on the contracts made for the benefit
of third party principals.
In an early Connecticut case of Butler v. American Toy Corzpany- the
court held (two judges dissenting) that the charter of the corporation bv
necessary intendment authorized it to take the place of the firm as a member
of the company partnership for the manufacture of toys and that by its
contract and actions thereunder it had become such a member.
Nearly all of the states have corporation laws which provide for the
incorporation of "cooperative associations" for the express purpose of en-
couraging "the organization of producers of agricultural prducts into effective
associations under the control of such producers," 27 and with the express
power "(a) To act as agent, broker or attorney in fact for its members and
for any subsidiary or affiliated association." 28 Some of the early statutes
merely stated in general terms that the producers and the association must
do business on the cooperative plan.29
2" Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160, 41 Pac. 855 (1895)
36 Butler v. American Toy Co., 46 Conn. 136 (1878)
"
TModel Agricultural Cooperative Association Act, § 1, UmUFomVi LAws AxN.,
Edward Thompson Co. (1942) Adopted mn Utah, LAWs OF UTAx (1937) C. 2.
Adopted in Maine, LAWS OF Mr. (1945) p. 322 et seq.
8 d. § 9 (a)
'
9 The early Washington Act of 1913 authorizing the incorporation of coop-
erative associations (Laws 1913, p. 52) merely stated that the associations were
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The very great preponderance of judicial decisions, as we shall observe,
have held that by statute or contract, or both, cooperative marketing corpora-
tions are the selling agents of their producer members.
AS BARGAINING AGENT ONLY
Certain loganberry growers of Oregon made common marketing agree-
ments in January 1918, with the Salem Fruit Union, a cooperative marketing
corporation, which read in part,
"Said grower'does hereby constitute and appoint the said "Umon as his sole
and lawful agent to enter into contract for him, and on his behalf, and in his
name for the sale of all the Loganberries to be grown upon his. premises, for. the
years of 1918 to 1921, inclusive."
There was a further provision in the marketing contract requiring the
delivery of said berries to the cooperative or at such place as it might desig-
nate. The cooperative elected not to take possession of the berries, but to act
simply as a collective bargaining agent for the growers. It executed in its
own name, a contract of sale to the Phez Company, a processing and canning
corporation, which recited that the cooperative was acting for growers who
had made contracts authorizing it to market their berries.
Some growers refused to deliver their berries to the Phez Company which
then brought suit against them for damages and injunction and prevailed.'The
Oregon Supreme Court said in part,
"While the marketing agent contracted in its own name, the body of the
agreement showed that it was acting for identifiable principal growers as their
bargaining agent and such contract is enforceable against the principals by the
third party as If the agent had signed their names."
The court also decided that the marketing contract created an irrevocable
agency.
"Where a cooperative having contracts with growers had agreed to cause the
delivery of said berries to a buyer corporation and to pay damages in case of
default, it had a power as bargaining agent coupled with an obligation which
prevented a revocation of the agency."
80
AGENCY PLUS BAMMENT
In an early case in Maine one Haarparnne brought an action for damages
to be created "for mutual welfare" and must do business on the cooperative plan.
Rlm. Rav. STAT, § 3910. See also EvANs AxD STociDYx, Tim LAW OF COOPzRATIV
Xmi o, Rochester, N. Y., The Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co. (1937) c. IX, The
Present Legislative Situation. However, the New York statutes since 1926 list
the cooperative marketing act under the short title, "Cooperative Corporation
Law."
"Phez Co. v. Salem Fruit'Union et al., 101 Ore.514, 201 Pac. 222 (1921), on
rehearing, 103 Ore. 514, 205 Pac. 970 (1922)
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against the Butter Hill Fruit Grower's Ass'n.5 ' for refusal to buy his apples
which were frozen before delivery to the association.
Section 8 of the certificate of incorporation provided in part:
"All goods produced for sale by the member shall be delivered to the associa-
tion for grading, packing, and slupment"
"In case any member is offered a price in excess of the price then obtainable
by the association, said member shall turn said bid over to the association for
filling from said member's goods."
"All members shall contract their entire crop of fruit to the Board of Directors
each year, whenever in the ]udgment of the board such contracts would prove of
benefit to the association."
The producer contended that these 'provisions created a non-cancellable
executory contract of purchase and that the corporation was bound to buy
his apples.
The court held that there was no sale of the fruit to the association, but
that the association was merely acting as a selling agent of the members; and
that it had agreed to take possession but not title to the produce for that
purpose, indicating, therefore, an agreement for a consignment which may be
defined as a bailment coupled with an agency for purposes of sale.
82
AGENCY PLUS TRUST OR AGENCY TITLE
In an early leading case of Bwrey Tobacco Society v. Giflaspy 8 the Indiana
Supreme Court disclosed an unusual comprehension of the economic and legal
philosophy of agricultural cooperative marketing. Its analysis in 1912 de-
lineated the basic nature and purposes of this new type of corporation in a
manner that has rarely been surpassed.
The Burley Tobacco Society had been incorporated in Kentucky The
attorney who drew the marketing agreement was an excellent draftsman as
well as a very competent lawyer. The cooperating tobacco growers including
one Gillaspy, had agreed individually that they did appoint the Burley
Tobacco Society, their sole agent "for the purpose of receiving, comningling,
handling, warehousing, inspecting, insuring, grading, financing, and selling
all of the said tobacco in such manner and on such terms as the Burley
3 1 Haarparine v. Butter Hill Fruit Growers Ass'n, 122 Me. 138, 119 A. 116
(1922)
32 In re Taylor (D. C. Mich.) 46 F (2d) 326, 328 (1931)
88 Burley Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N. . 89 (1912)
"Where the benefits of membership in a corporation organized to foster the in-
terests of growers of tobacco and to act as selling agents and assist in obtaining
a fair price were contingent on the willingness of all members to abide by their
contracts, and damages for breach would be difficult of ascertainment and could
not be measured by any exact standard, a stipulation in the contract of a sum
(20% of the value of the member's crop) as liquidated damages for failure to
comply with it was not a stipulation for a penalty."
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Tobacco Society may prescribe pursuant to their charter and by-laws, and
for suck purpose hereby transfer and assign to and invest m said agents the
title and right of possession to said tobacco." The growers also agreed to
deliver their respective tobacco crops on demand of the cooperative at the
place designated by it for delivery.
Gilaspy refused to make delivery when demanded by the .cooperative and
it thereupon brought action against him for liquidated damages as stipulated
in his marketing agreement. The Indiana Supreme Court declared the coopera-
tive to be an agent of its members for the dissemination to them of informa-
tion and for the marketing of their tobacco crops. It decided that the member
must pay liquidated damages for hIs breach of contract. It held that public
policy favored the establishment of combinations of agricultural producers
to secure a fair price for their products, because such result would msure an
economically sound agriculture and enhance the general welfare.
The marketing contract was carefully drawn to indicate the passage of
title to the patron's products in special trust to enable the agent to accomplish
more effectively the purpose of the agency The deliberate onssion of the
terms of sale and purchase were quite as significant as was the affirmative
statement specifying the many special purposes for which the title was to be
transferred upon delivery to the cooperative corporation.
The dicta of the Gillaspy case, to the effect that a special agency title
passed to the cooperative, finds sound legal analogy us two important situations
in business law, in which a trustee title passes to an agent: first, in voting
trusts us private corporation law,"' and second, in the case of those Massa-
chusetts business trusts, which are held -to be partnerships because the con-
tracts make the trustees also the agents of the beneficiaries due to the power
of control of the business reserved to the beneficiaries.85 In both of these sit-
uations there is no sale, but there is a transfer of title to personal property
which creates an irrevocable agency, coupled with an interest, to facilitate
the agreed purposes of the agency.8 6 The transfer of a title in trust to facilitate
, HAmY A. Cusma, VoTinc TRuSTs, New York, The Macmillan Co. (1927) 57.
35 Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355 (1913), is an
early and leading case holding that a business trust, in which the beneficiaries
were given the right to control the business policies of the trust, created an
agency as well as a trust and therefore, the beneficiaries were co-partners in the
business association. See also Gold Water v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624
(1930), 71 A. L. R. .871 (1931) and cases therein cited.
" Another common *situation of corporation agent where there is often a
transfer of title to facilitate the agency is the endorsement and delivery of
negotiable paper to a~bank for collection. Professor, Mecham, a leading authority
on agency, analyzes these cases on the principle of agency alone with hardly
any discussion of the agency title which is transferred. 1 M zc r, A TanATmz
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the performance of the agency by the trustee might well be termed an agency
title. The marketing contract in the Burley Tobacco Society case, sutpra,
stipulated many of the purposes for which such agency title was transferred
to the cooperative corporation. It appears, therefore, that the delivery by
member patrons of their products to the cooperative marketing corporation
frequently creates an agency plus trust, or an agency plus an agency title.
A survey of the corporation law cases involving questions of legal relation-
ship of the patron and the cooperative shows that the by-laws and marketing
agreements have almost uniformly clothed the marketing transaction in terms
of sale and purchase.
The great preponderance of the same group of cases construe the sale and
purchase language as being merely an erroneous legal designation of a rela-
tionship which in reality is that of multiple principal producers to their
common selling agent.
A recent well-reasoned case which disregards the sale and purchase language
of the marketing agreement and finds an agency (or agency plus trust) is
Judge Schwellenbach's opinion in Bowles, Price Administrator of the Office of
Price Administration (OPA) v. Inland Empire Dairy Association.7 The case
arose in the State of Washington and was decided in 1943.
The marketing agreement was included in the by-laws. It provided in part
as follows:
"The dairyman hereby, * 0 * * agrees to sell and deliver to the Association
or to any place designated by the Association all of the milk or cream produced
by or for him in the State of Washington, Idaho, or any place tributary to
Spokane, and the Association agrees to buy and receive such milk or cream and
to remit to the member for the same on the basis of market pries as con-
clusively established by the Association from time to time."58
The Federal Government contended that this provision, supplemented by
others of similar vein, created a seller-purchaser relationship between the
dairymen patrons and the cooperative association, and that, under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 as amended, U.S.C.A. Appendix Section
925 (a), the past and proposed future payment of patronage dividends vio-
lated Maximum Price Regulation No. 329, controlling purchases of milk from
ox Tmn LAw or AGENcY (2d ed. 1914) § 1312-1314. On the other hand, Scott, a
leading authority on the law of trusts, discusses this situation "as agent, or
trustee or bailee until collection," ( 534) but not as a sale and purchase of the
negotiable paper in absence of express intention to buy and sell. 3 ScoTr, TnE
LAW or TRUSTS (1939) §§ 533-534.
"Bowles v. Inland Empire Dairy Association, 53 F Supp. 210 (E. D. Wash.,
1943)
'1 Id. at 212, n. 1.
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producers for resale as fluid milk. (OPA Service p. 35,851 et seq.)3 9
The Government petitioned for an injunction to restrain defendant asso-
ciation from paying any further "patronage dividends" (net margins) to its
member and non-member patrons and to compel defendant to charge back
against its patrons certain "patronage dividends" (net margins) paid out to
them on April 30, 1943. If this could be accomplished, it would in the, words
of the court, "make a war casualty of the Farmer Cooperative System. ' 40
The association contended that in spite of its written agreement by wich
the members expressly agreed to sell and the association to buy the member's
milk that in fact and in law the corporation did not buy milk from its patrons,
but merely accepted delivery thereof, processed the milk and sold it for its
patrons as their agent, and that, therefore, the patronage payments com-
plamed about were not part of the "price paid" but merely the final payments
due the patron from moneys earlier received to his account over and above
the costs of operation and the accumulation of reserves allowed by state law.
The association was obviously in the difficult position of having to convince
the court that the contracting parties actually intended to create a continuing
agency even though they had expressly stated m writing in the by-laws that
they intended a series of sale and purchase transactions.
The court demed the injunction and held that the patrons had not been
and were not then selling their milk to the cooperative corporation, but were
delivering milk to their corporate agent for sale on their behalf. The court
further held that the first sale took place when the corporation sold the
patron's processed milk to the consumer and cited numerous cases supporting
this view.41
u maximum price regulation No. 329, § 1351.402 provides: "(a) The maximum
price for each gallon of milk shall be the highest price each purchaser of milk
from a producer paid that producer for milk of the same grade received during
Jan. 1943 " Sec. 1351.404 defines a purchaser as, "(d) Purchaser means any
person who buys milk from a producer for resale. It refers to any branch,
division,, subsidiary, affiliate, or portion of a business organization, whether cor-
porate or otherwise, purchasing milk from producers or other operations in
different localities."
'°Bowles v. Inland Empire Dairy Ass'n; 53 F. Supp. 210, 220 (E. D. Wash.,
1943)
'"Kansas Wheat Growers v. Board, 119 Kan. 877, 241 Pac. 465 (1925), Phez
Co. v. Salem Fruit Union, 101 Ore. 514, 201 Pac. 222 (1921), 25 A. L, R. 1090,
1113 (1923); Mountain State Beet Growers Ass'n v. Monroe 84 Colo. 300, 269 Pac.
886 (1928); Tobacco Growers Cooperative Ass'n v. Harvey & Son Co., 189 N. C.
494, 127 S. E. 545, 547 (1925), 47 A. L. R. 928, 936 (1927); Oregon Growers' Coop.
v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 212 Pac. 811 (1923); Owen County Tobacco Society v.
Grumback, 128 Ky. 137, 107 S. W 710 (1908), 32 Ky. Law. Rep. 916; Poultry
Producers v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 Pac. 93 (1922);. California Raisin Growers
v. Abbott, 160 Cal. 601, 117 Pac. 767,.(1911); Texas Certified Cottonseed Breeders'
Ass'n v. Aldrich, 122 Tax. 464, 61 S. W (2d) 79 (1933) See aLso: Inland' Empire
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The decision does not state whether the court regarded the situation as one
of bailment or of the transfer of title in trust to facilitate the agency The
quotations from other cases indicate that the court would favor the passing
of an agency title if that point had been necessary for a decision. Without
taking a definite position on the nature of the property interest of the
cooperative the court rested its decision on the fact that there was no price
agreed upon between the association and the patrons, and further observed
that "the responsibility for mistakes of management and for losses in col-
lection must be borne by him," (the patron) and that the only "price rnvolved
in the transaction occurs" in the retail sale by the cooperative corporation
to the ultimate consumer at the proper ceiling price of 13c per quart.
42
The court cited with favor an earlier Washington case of Yaktma Fruit
Growers' Ass'n v. Henneford et al.4 In this case the court disregarded the
sale and purchase language of the marketing agreement and held the relation-
ship between the patrons and the cooperative to be that of multiple principals
and common agent. It therefore held that the cooperative marketing corpora-
tion was not subject to an occupation tax because it was not engaged in
business "with the object of gain, benefit or advantage."
The Washington Supreme Court wrote in part:
"The appellants (members of Washington State Tax Commission) say that
the respondents, (the cooperative corporation) in their method of doing business,
are independent contractors, and cite a number of cases which we have exam-
ined, but which, in our opinion do not sustain the contention. The respondents
cite a number of cases holding the relationship between members of cooperative
associations and the corporations to be that of agency and this appears to be the
generally accepted rule with reference to such orgamzations."
"We see no reason for holding that, because a large number of producers,
most of whom are not what would be called large producers, cause a corporation
to be organized for the purpose of assisting them in the production, packing,
warehousing, and sale, they should not be on the same basis as a producer
Rural Electrification, Inc. v. Department of Public Service, 199 Wash, 527, 539,
92 P (2d) 258 (1939), Owensboro v. Dark Tobacco Growers, 222 Ky. 164, 300 S.
W 350 (1927), Dark Tobacco Growers' Cooperative v. Robertson, 84 Ind. App.
51, 150 N. E. 106, 112 (1926), Georgia Milk Producers v. Atlanta, 185 Ga. 192, 194
S. E. 181 (1937); Department of Treasury v. Ice Service, 220 Ind. 64, 41 N. E. (2d)
201 (1942), Industrial Commission v. United Fruit Growers, 106 Colo. 223, 103
P (2d) 15 (1940), Bogardus v. Santa Ana Walnut Growers, 41 Cal. App. (2d)
939, 108 P (2d) 52 (1940), Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., 230 App. Div. 571, 245
N. Y. S. 432 (1930), affirmed: 256 N. Y. 559, 177 N. E. 140 (1931); Johnson v
Staple Cotton Co-op., 142 Miss. 312, 107 So. 2 (1926)
4"-Bowles v. Inland Empire Dairy Ass'n, 53 F Supp. 210, 220 (E. D. Wash.,
1943), cited supra note 40.
Is Yakima Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 437, 47 P (2d) 831, 832
(1935) 100 A. L. R. 435, 439 (1936), cited with approval in Bowles v. Inland
Empire Ass'n, supra note 42.
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individually, whether large.or small, or two or more persons cooperating together
by 3oint enterprise rather than by corporate entity. The fact that they operate
through a corporate entity in which they own the stock and the corporation
makes no profit and distributes the proceeds after a sale and the payment of
expenses on a pro rata per box basis does not put them in a maternally different
situation than if two or more of them cooperated simply as members of a
joint undertaking without corporate existence.
"The fact that a certain percentage are not producers, owing to the fact that
they had sold their orchard land, is merely incidental, and is not of controlling
importance. In any reasonable sense, the respondents, as corporations, are not
engaged in business for profit, and, in fact, they do not make any. They are
merely the agents of their stockholders, the producers, and are not, as already
indicated, independent contractors.'""
The foregoing and similar cases show the importance for lawyers who
serve cooperative corporations to use language of principal and agent, bail-
ment and trust, or terminology used in the Gillaspy case, supra, rather than
the erroneous phraseology of sale and purchase.
In spite of the persistent and erroneous language of sale and purchase
commonly found in marketing agreements, the courts have.repeatedly over-
come the presumption that the parties intended what they said and have in
the great majority of cases declared the relations of patron and cooperative
to be that of principal and agent.'3
SALE AND PURCHASE
There are a few courts that have bound the cooperative and the patrons
by the express language of sale and purchase found in the marketing contract,
or in the by-laws, or in both.
In Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall" the Texas Supreme
Court indicated that a marketing agreement similar to the one construed in
the Inland Empire Dairy Ass'n case, supra, created a relationship of sellers
and buyers between the producer members and the cooperative corporation.
The court, while stating that it was unnecessary to decide whether the
contract was one of ordinary sale and purchase or of agency, did nevertheless,
make the following obiter dicta:
"But when the statute is examined and the contract analyzed, it Is quite
plain that in its essential aspects the contract is not one of agency as that term
is ordinarily understood."' 7
"In general it may be said that If it is manifest from the contract that it was
intended title should pass and the price be paid, the transaction constitutes a
'
4 Id. at 442.
15 See note 41 supra.
16Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, 113 Tex. 273, 253 S. W. 1101
(1923).
"4 Id. 253 S. W. at 1107, fT 11.
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sale. * * * 'The parties agree that this is a contract for the purchase and sale of
personal property.' * * * It was the manifest purpose of the parties that the
Association should take title to the cotton delivered to it, and that defendant
in error (the member) should lose all dominion over it.14 8
"The fact that the cotton is to be placed m a pool with the cotton of other
growers, and the grower paid from the net proceeds of the pool, instead of from
the net proceeds of his own cotton, clearly shows that the purpose was to pass
title to the Association.""
"We think the price to be paid under this contract is sufficiently definite and
certain. The price is to be defendant in error's proportionate share of the net
proceeds from the sale of the pool, or pools, in which his cotton may be placed.""0
The Texas court's analysis of "price" does not appear to be sound. There
was neither a definite price agreed upon nor a reasonable price implied from
the writing between or the conduct of the parties," but on the contrary an
agreement to return the net proceeds from the sale of the pooled cotton after
deducting the costs of sale and withholding reasonable marginal retains for
corporation reserves. Such writings and conduct indicate a sale for the benefit
of the cotton growers at such a price as may be realized in the future by a
common marketing agent.
Justice Schwellenbach's analysis of the question of "price" in the Inland
Empire case, supra, appears to be irrefutable when he declared that the only
evidence of price was the amount paid to the cooperative by the purchaser
from the cooperative. Bowles case, supra, an agreement to return to the
producer net proceeds is not an agreement to pay a price as that word is
understood in the law of sales .52 The erroneous reasoning of the Texas
Supreme Court that a purchaser title instead of a trust or agency title passed
to the corporation did not, however, mitigate against a proper decision of the
Stovall case, supra. The court reversed the decision of both the trial and
intermediate appellate courts and ordered an injunction against the producer
who threatened to violate his marketing contract.
A later Texas case corrects the erroneous although non-prejudicial reason-
ing of the earlier Stovall case, supra. The court wrote in the later case of
Texas Certifled Cottonseed Breeders' Ass'n v. Aldndge:5 3
Is Id. at ff 12, 13.
,Id. at 9 14.
oId. at f 9.
51 See notes in 33 A. L. R. 255, 47 A. L. R. 947, and 77 A. L. R. 414.
"2 The Uniform Sales Act provides: "(2) A sale of goods is an agreement
whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a considera-
tion called the price." 1 UmFoEm LAWS ANN. 4, Edward H. Thompson Co. See
1 WLLisTON, TiE LAW OF SALES (1924) § 171.
"3Texas Certified Cottonseed Breeders' Ass'n v. Aldridge, 122 Tex. 464, 61
S. W (2d) 79 (1933)
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"What is the nature of the title by which an association holds property which
it is marketing for its members? To what extent does it act in its own corporate
right and to what extent in a fiduciary capacity ? The intention of the parties to
a contract will control. If necessary, to give effect to the intention of the parties
courts will brush aside mere form and examine the instrument as a whole, in the
light of the nature and circumstances of the transaction, with a view of ascer-
taming the true intention of the parties expressed in the instrument. * * * By
the terms of the contract the grower has surrendered control over the sale of
his product, and thereby to this extent has divested himself of an important
element of ownership. The contract upon this point is clothed in the terminology
of a sale. The relation of consignor and factor has been abandoned. The logical
and practical ob3ect of the members, as expressed in the contract, is to clothe
the transaction in the language of a sale for the purpose of permitting the
exercise of all powers named in the contract rather than a consignment in order
to enable the association to enter bona fide transactions free from the embarrass-
ment arising out of an incomplete title. * * * The members of the association,
in order to promote their welfare, delivered their seed to the association. They
constituted the association their agent" with broad and exclusive powers to
handle and sell their commodity. This was necessary to accomplish the very
purposes for which it was created."
A Wisconsin case of Neith Cooperative Dairy Products Ass'n v. National
Cheese Producers' Federation5 illustrates how sale and purchase language
may bind the parties by the legal incidents of that relationship even though
at the end of the fiscal year there was a practice to disburse accumulated
marginal retains and to charge for overpayments upon the particular state
of the accounts between the each member and the joint marketing cor-
poration.
In this case the National Cheese Producers' Federation, a cooperative, was
a member of the Neith Cooperative Dairy Products Ass'n, a federated co-
operative. The plaintiff brought an action for the purchase price of cheese
sold, and the defendant counter-rimed for an almost identical amount
claimed to be over-advances by the agent to plaintiff as a principal.
In holding the agreement to be one of sale and purchase and not agency
the court said:
"The contract is denominated a 'Contract of Purchase and Sale.' The agree-
ment on the part of any local joined to the federation under such a contract is
that it will sell to the federation all cheese produced by or for such local of the
styles which the federation regularly handles. The federation on its part agrees
that it will "buy all the cheese produced by or for the local of the styles which
the federation regularly handles; and that the purchase price which -it will pay
for the cheese shall be the average price which it receives upon a resale minus
a uniform charge to approximately cover the expense of marketing; average
price to be based upon the federations total monthly receipts from the sale of
5
, Neith Cooperative Dairy Products Ass'n v. National Cheese Producers' Fed-
eration, - Wis. -, 257 N. W 624 (1934)
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cheese of the same type and quality; the uniform charge to be determined m
amount by the board of directors of the federation." Paragraph 8 of the agree-
ment provides that payment shall be made on the 20th day of each month for
cheese shipped by the local during the month before the month which precedes
the date of payment.
"Defendant contends that what the board does when it fixes the purchase
price to be paid on the 20th of the month is to approximate the selling price and
approximate the expenses; that at the end of the year, upon a recheck, it may
modify this price m either direction. If there is a surplus, it may declare a
dividend and distribute the surplus. If there is a deficit, it may reclaim the
overpayments. This is not a fair construction of the contract.
"If the payments on the 20th of each month were held to be advances, the
cases would be applicable and would support defendant's contentions.
"The contract clearly settles this controversy adversely to defendant. It is a
contract of purchase and sale. The local, m this case the plaintiff, agrees to sell
all of its product to the federation, and the federation agrees to pay for it. The
dates of payment are specifically set forth in the contract, and they are dates
of payment and not advances. It will be noted that the federation does not pay
for the cheese until at least fifty days after delivery, and we cannot resist
the conclusion that this is to enable the board of directors to safely fix a final
price.
"It is true that, if the average price as set by the board of directors has been
so conservative as to result in a surplus at the end of the year, it has been the
practice to distribute this surplus to the members. This practice does not affect
the foregoing conclusions. The distributees receive the surplus because they are
members and not because they are vendors."
From the foregoing analysis of cooperative corporation law on the market-
ing transaction, it will be observed that the basic relationship between the
cooperator-members, and the marketing corporation is that of multiple prin-
cipals to a common agent to whom the former have delivered title to their
products to facilitate the most efficient and profitable sale thereof.
It is of importance that lawyers engaged in the practice of cooperative
law should carefully distinguish between the conflicting concepts of sale,
agency, bailment, and trust and carefully draft the by-laws and marketing
agreements to facilitate the desired economic results through the creation
of appropriate legal relationships.
